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Title: The pricing mechanism to the buyer with a budget constraint and an indirect mechanism
Authors: Kojima, N
Keywords: Multi-dimensional mechanism, indirect mechanism, budget constraint,;revelation principle
Issue Date: 2005
Publisher: Brunel University
Citation: Economics and Finance Working papers, Brunel University, 05-07
Abstract: The present article considers the situation in which the buyer’s taste and budget are his private information. In this multi-dimensional setting, we study the optimal mechanism through a canonical mechanism in the traditional one-dimensional context: a function of one variable, the buyer’s taste. In our multi-dimensional context, however, this is an indirect mechanism. We investigate the effectiveness and limit of this indirect mechanism in the framework of the revelation principle.
Appears in Collections:Economics and Finance
Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers

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