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Title: Partial delegation in a model of currency crisis
Authors: Boinet, V
Keywords: Currency crisis; Multiple equilibria; Credibility; Monetary delegation
Issue Date: 2002
Publisher: Brunel University
Citation: Economics and Finance Working papers, Brunel University, 02-07
Abstract: Stressing the inßuence of expected devaluation on currency crises, this paper shows that, in a Þxed exchange-rate system with an escape clause, partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to an inßation-averse central banker reduces the probability of crisis.
Appears in Collections:Economics and Finance
Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers

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