Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: The Political Economy of Financial Development
Authors: Girma, S
Shortland, A
Issue Date: 2008
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Citation: Girma, S. and Shortland, A (2008): The Political Economy of Financial Development; accepted for publication in the journal Oxford Economic Papers
Abstract: Political economy theories of financial development argue that in countries where a narrow elite controls political decisions, financial development may be obstructed to deny access to finance to potential competitors. We use panel data on developed and developing countries from 1975- 2000 to examine this hypothesis, as well as looking at the effect of regime stability on financial development. Our results show that the degree of democracy and political stability are significant explanatory factors in determining the speed of financial development. The banking sector benefits from regime stability and increasing democracy, while stock market capitalisation grows fastest in fully democratic regimes.
Appears in Collections:Economics and Finance
Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Oxford Economic Papers - Shortland 2008.txt587 BTextView/Open

Items in BURA are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.