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|Title:||The pricing mechanism to the buyer with a budget constraint and an indirect mechanism|
|Keywords:||Multi-dimensional mechanism, indirect mechanism, budget constraint,;revelation principle|
|Citation:||Economics and Finance Working papers, Brunel University, 05-07|
|Abstract:||The present article considers the situation in which the buyer’s taste and budget are his private information. In this multi-dimensional setting, we study the optimal mechanism through a canonical mechanism in the traditional one-dimensional context: a function of one variable, the buyer’s taste. In our multi-dimensional context, however, this is an indirect mechanism. We investigate the effectiveness and limit of this indirect mechanism in the framework of the revelation principle.|
|Appears in Collections:||Economics and Finance|
Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers
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